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Scenario-Based Seismic Risk Assessment for Buried
Transmission Gas Pipelines at Regional Scale
Raffaele De Risi1; Flavia De Luca2; Oh-Sung Kwon, M.ASCE3; and Anastasios Sextos, M.ASCE4
Abstract: Buried gas pipelines in seismic-prone regions may suffer leaks or breaks as a consequence of an earthquake, especially if the
pipeline is subjected to large differential displacements due to geotechnical failures (e.g., landslide or liquefaction). This paper presents a
methodology to assess the risk of a gas pipeline infrastructure at a regional level in the aftermath of a seismic event. Once earthquake
characteristics, such as magnitude and epicenter, are known, seismic intensity measures (IMs), such as peak ground acceleration (PGA)
and peak ground velocity (PGV), are estimated at the location of each pipe through a simulation-based procedure. The potential updating
from real-time data coming from accelerometric stations is considered. These IMs are then used to study the cascading landslide and lique-
faction hazards, providing a hybrid empirical-mechanical-based estimation of permanent ground displacements (PGD). With the aid of dam-
age and fragility functions from the literature, loss figures and damage maps are derived as decision-support tools for network managers and
stakeholders. Losses provide a preliminary estimation of repair costs, whereas damage maps support the prioritization of inspections in the
aftermath of the event. The risk methodology is a novel combination of cutting-edge and consolidated approaches. Firstly, different cross-
correlation models between PGA and PGV are included. Secondly, a new three-phase back-to-back geotechnical approach is provided for
both landslide and liquefaction, representing (1) the susceptibility, (2) the triggering, and (3) the PGD estimation phases. The 1976 Friuli
earthquake and the high-pressure gas network of northeast Italy are used as a test-bed scenario for the risk methodology aimed at emphasizing
pros and cons of the different alternative options investigated. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)PS.1949-1204.0000330. This work is made available
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Author keywords: Shake map; Landslide risk; Liquefaction risk; Cross-correlated intensity measures; Loss curve; Damage map; Decision
support systems.
Introduction
Earthquakes can severely damage buried gas transmission net-
works (O’Rourke and Palmer 1996). As a result, reliable damage
assessment in the aftermath of an earthquake and the development
of enhanced fragility models are among the main challenges to be
undertaken in seismic engineering of buried pipelines (Pineda-
Porras and Najafi 2010). In recent decades, great efforts have been
made to improve the methodologies for pipeline vulnerability as-
sessment. For example, Lanzano et al. (2015) compiled one of
the most extensive databases of observed damage to pipelines
after earthquakes, providing an excellent base for the creation of
empirical fragility models. It has been emphasized that buried
gas transmission pipelines are particularly vulnerable to geotechni-
cal failures such as landslides and liquefaction phenomena, because
they generate large ground deformations, creating large stress con-
centrations at the joints (Wham and O’Rourke 2015). Edkins et al.
(2016) gave a detailed description of observed damage in the after-
math of an earthquake to pipeline systems of different materials.
Damage to gas pipelines can lead to issues in energy production;
if the connection with thermoelectric power stations is interrupted,
it can affect everyday life, stopping energy flow to homes. More-
over, the damage can trigger major cascading accidents, such as
fires and explosions, also known as natural hazard triggering tech-
nological disasters. Thus, there is a pressing need for the develop-
ment of a reliable risk-based decision support system (DSS) that
can generate loss figures and damage maps of infrastructure
immediately after an earthquake event. Such information can then
be used to prioritize inspections and interventions to rehabilitate the
gas transmission service as fast as possible (Elsawah et al. 2016).
Several relevant studies are available in the literature on the
seismic risk assessment of buried pipelines. Initially, only scenario-
based ground shaking was considered (Hwang et al. 2004; Toprak
and Taskin 2007). Subsequently, the importance of geotechnical
failures was emphasized and geotechnical models have been in-
corporated in the risk methodologies (e.g., Mousavi et al. 2014).
O’Rourke et al. (2014) were among the first to emphasize the im-
portance of having reliable underpinning data to produce robust
and comprehensive risk figures. Finally, Esposito et al. (2015) em-
phasized the importance of correlation models among intensity
measures and envisaged the possibility of adopting simulation-
based hazard-assessment procedures.
Building upon the seminal research mentioned previously, this
paper presents a Monte Carlo simulation–based methodology that
can generate preliminary information about the status of a buried
gas pipeline infrastructure after a seismic event. This methodology
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introduces several novelties with respect to previous works.
First, the intensity measures at several locations are investigated
considering different forms of geographical correlations and cross-
correlations between intensity measures, i.e., peak ground acceler-
ation (PGA) and peak ground velocity (PGV). Second, a procedure
to anchor the ground shaking simulations to observed values is pre-
sented. Third, more-refined large-scale geotechnical procedures
are developed through a three-phase study of (1) susceptibility,
(2) triggering, and (3) ground displacements caused by both land-
slide and liquefaction. Previous works focused mainly on land-
slides and adopted the simplified procedure recommended in
HAZUS (FEMA 2004). Finally, existing empirical vulnerability
and fragility functions are used to compute loss curves and damage
maps, respectively. This paper represents for the first time the earth-
quake consequences on gas lifelines as expected damage maps,
which is considered to be a key deliverable for informed decision
making.
The following sections describe the methodology and apply it to
a virtual case study; a portion of the high-pressure gas transmission
system in the northeast region of Italy is analyzed under the effect
of the 1976 Italian Friuli event. This case study is virtual because
the pipeline network considered herein (based on 2013 informa-
tion) was not completely built at the time of the earthquake event
(i.e., 1976). The combination, however, of the model of a real
gas network with an actual seismic scenario is deemed to be a use-
ful platform to demonstrate the efficiency and limitations of the
methodology.
Methodology
Risk assessment for spatially-distributed infrastructures, such as
road networks and buried pipeline systems, requires (1) the iden-
tification of the main properties of critical components of the infra-
structure, their failure mechanisms, and the associated vulnerability
models; (2) the acquisition of the underlying data complementary
to the infrastructure (e.g., the soil geotechnical properties); (3) a
hazard assessment procedure capable of providing seismic intensity
measures at regional scale; and, finally, (4) a risk quantification
procedure consisting of the convolution of hazard and vulnerability
models. Figs. 1 and 2 provide a graphical representation of the
framework developed in this study involving the steps to assess
the network hazard (Fig. 1) and risk (Fig. 2).
For a buried gas pipeline system, specific information is needed
[Fig. 1(a)]: the geometry of the system; the buried depth; the
service pressure; and the diameters, materials, and joint typologies
of the pipes. Such characteristics are necessary for choosing a
suitable vulnerability model among those available in the literature
(e.g., ALA 2001; Piccinelli and Krausmann 2013; Lanzano et al.
2015).
Once the system geometry is available, a discretization of
the pipeline is needed; specifically, each element of the system
is divided in segments with a length (L) which is small enough
to neglect behavior/property variability along the segments. Each
pipeline segment is represented by its midpoint. Complementary
data to the infrastructure is all the information necessary to define
the topographic, geologic, and geotechnical problems of the buried
system [Fig. 1(b)]: the digital elevation model (DEM) map; the
slope map; the shear wave velocity map of the upper 30 m of soil
(Vs;30); the geolithology map, representing the local lithology from
which, in the absence of detailed surveys, it is possible to obtain
the geotechnical properties (friction angle ϕ, cohesion c, and self-
weight γ); and the groundwater table map.
For a postevent seismic risk assessment, information about the
earthquake also is necessary [Fig. 1(c)]. Essential data are the event
magnitude and the epicenter location, or the fault plane, which are
normally publicly available soon after the event. Additional data,
allowing the refinement of the hazard model, are the strong motion
records from seismic stations. Once earthquake data are available,
the hazard model can be developed based on predefined ground
motion prediction equations (GMPEs) [Fig. 1(d)]. The hazard
model is then used to generate the seismic intensity measures
(IMs): the peak ground acceleration and the peak ground velocity.
For buried infrastructure systems, the permanent ground displace-
ment (PGD) also is required; this is the IM typically adopted for the
interpretation of geotechnical failures and should not be confused
with peak ground displacement. This study presents a new back-to-
back three-phase geotechnical model allowing the quantification of
the PGD due to landslide and liquefaction phenomena.
Seismic Hazard Model
To account for the uncertainty in seismic actions due to a specific
earthquake, this study adopts a stochastic simulation-based pro-
cedure to estimate seismic IMs (in terms of PGA and PGV) at
the midpoint of each pipeline segment ðIMÞ. Specifically, IMs
are assumed to follow joint lognormal distribution, with central
values ðIMÞ computed by a GMPE and covariance calculated with
a correlation model. The following formulation is adopted:
logðIMÞ ∼ N½logðIMÞ; σ2I · C ð1Þ
where σI = intraevent standard error of the selected GMPE;
C = correlation matrix; and σ2I · C = covariance matrix (Σ) of
the lognormal distribution. Such an approach is largely adopted
to predict IMs probabilistically due to a specific earthquake
scenario (e.g., Wald et al. 2006).
This study investigated three main correlation models [Fig. 1(e)]:
(C1) uncorrelated IMs, (C2) IMs spatially correlated according to
Goda and Hong (2008), and (C3) IMs correlated and cross-
correlated according to Weatherill et al. (2014). The spatial corre-
lation provides the correlation between the same IM (i.e., PGA or
PGV) at different geographical locations. The cross-correlation
provides the correlation between values of PGA and PGV. For
the first case, C1, the correlation matrix is equal to the identity
matrix, therefore IMs at different locations will be completely
uncorrelated. For C2, terms of the correlation matrix (ρi;j) are
obtained as a function of the site-to-site distances (Ri;j) between
the midpoints of segment i and segment j
C ¼
2
6664
1 ρi;jðRi;jÞ
. .
.
ρj;iðRi;jÞ 1
3
7775 ð2Þ
Several equations for calculating the correlation coefficients are
available in the literature (e.g., Goda and Atkinson 2010; Esposito
and Iervolino 2011, 2012). The functions to compute ρi;j are differ-
ent for PGA and PGV and they differ for different geographical
region and seismogenetic contexts. Correlation terms are equal
to 1 if the interdistance is equal to 0, and they decrease to 0 for
very large values of Ri;j.
Finally, for C3, the correlation matrix contains both spatial and
cross correlation terms
© ASCE 04018018-2 J. Pipeline Syst. Eng. Pract.
 J. Pipeline Syst. Eng. Pract., 2018, 9(4): 04018018 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 a
sc
el
ib
ra
ry
.o
rg
 b
y 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
ris
to
l o
n 
09
/1
9/
18
. C
op
yr
ig
ht
 A
SC
E.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y;
 al
l r
ig
ht
s r
es
er
ve
d.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Fig. 1. Computational framework for scenario-based seismic hazard: (a) Infrastructure; (b) maps; (c) event; (d) ground motion prediction equations
(GMPEs); (e) intensity measure (IM) correlation models; (f) PGA and PGV; (g) susceptibility; (h) triggering; (i) landslide-induced permanent ground
displacement (PGD); (j) susceptibility; (k) triggering; and (l) liquefaction-induced PGD.
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C ¼
 CPGA CPGA;PGV
CPGA;PGV CPGV

ð3Þ
where CPGA and CPGV are obtained according to Eq. (2), and the
generic term of the matrix CPGA;PGV is equal to
ρi;j ¼ ρPGA;PGV ·
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ρPGAi;jðRi;jÞ
q
·
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ρPGVi;jðRi;jÞ
q
ð4Þ
where ρPGA;PGV = correlation term between PGA and PGV, and can
be estimated by bespoke statistical analyses based on recorded data
in a given geographical region.
If information from seismic stations is available, the hazard
model can be further refined by updating the probability model
with the observed IM values. To demonstrate this possibility,
correlation models C2 and C3 were modified according to the pro-
cedure described by Miano et al. (2016) in order to consider avail-
able information from seismic stations. These two additional
models are named C4 and C5, corresponding to C2 and C3, respec-
tively. In both C4 and C5, the central values of the distribution and
the covariance matrix are defined according to
IM ¼

IM1
IM2

Σ ¼
 ΣIM1 ΣIM1;IM2
ΣIM2;IM1 ΣIM2

ð5Þ
In Eq. (5), IM1 = intensity measure calculated with the GMPE
for the points of interest (e.g., the midpoint of the pipes in this
study); IM2 = intensity measure calculated for the seismic stations;
ΣIM1 and ΣIM2 = covariance matrixes for the points of interest
and for the seismic stations, respectively; and ΣIM1;IM2 = cross-
covariance matrix between the points of interest and the seismic
stations’ locations. Let X indicate the intensity measure acquired
at the seismic stations; the statistics of the joint distribution of the
IMs at the sites of interest, updated with the acquired dataX, can be
computed according to Eqs. (6) and (7)
logðIM1j2Þ¼ logðIM1ÞþΣIM1;IM2 ·Σ−1IM2 · ½logðXÞ− logðIM2Þ
ð6Þ
ΣIM1jIM2 ¼ ΣIM1 − ΣIM1;IM2 · Σ−1IM2 · ΣIM2;IM1 ð7Þ
Therefore IM1j2 and ΣIM1jIM2 can be used in Eq. (1) to
simulate IM fields that are anchored to real observations.
Geotechnical Model
For each of the five correlation models described previously
[Fig. 1(e)], it is possible to obtain simulated intensity measure fields
of PGA and PGV [Fig. 1(f)], however, such IMs are not enough
for the case of buried infrastructural systems. This is because,
for such kinds of infrastructure, PGD is also required because sev-
eral vulnerability/fragility models are expressed in these terms.
PGD cannot be calculated by GMPEs but it is inferred from PGA
and PGV because none of the GMPEs predicts PGD. This is mainly
due to a lack of confidence in the low-frequency content of re-
corded ground motions, leading to lack of confidence in peak
ground displacements and consequently PGD, with which the latter
is strongly correlated (Malhotra 2015). PGD is the combination
of three main contributions: (1) coseismic, (2) landslide, and
(3) liquefaction displacements. This study neglects coseismic ef-
fects because, in general, they do not present localized differential
displacements that can influence pipelines; obviously, additional
[ PGAi, PGVi, PGDi ] (b) (c)
(d)
(a)
(e)
R
ep
ai
r r
at
e 
(1/
km
)
R
ep
ai
r r
at
e 
(1/
km
)
PGDPGV
• ALA 2001
• Strong Ground Shaking (SGS)
• Ground Failure (GF)
SGS GF
• Leaks:    0.8 SGS + 0.2 GF
• Breaks:   0.2 SGS + 0.8 GF
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
PGAPGV
PDS2
PDS1
PDS0
PDS2
PDS1
PDS0
SGS GF
ds(SGS) =
max(PDS0,PDS1,PDS2)
ds(GF) =
max(PDS0,PDS1,PDS2)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
# of breaks# of leaks
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
repair costrepair cost
ds0
ds1
ds2
Expected damage states
Fig. 2. Scenario-based seismic risk assessment in terms of loss curves and damage maps: (a) hazard simulation in terms of PGA, PGV, and PGD;
(b) vulnerability functions; (c) loss curves; (d) fragility functions; and (e) damage maps.
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studies are necessary to better understand if specific conditions
affect buried pipelines.
This study develops two new geotechnical models for landslide
and liquefaction phenomena. These two models have a similar
algorithm consisting of three assessment phases: (1) the analysis
of the susceptibility to landslides and liquefaction (2) the probabi-
listic assessment of the triggering, and (3) the estimation of the
resulting PGD. The susceptibility analysis is based on empirical
failure domains; such domains are functions of the magnitude
of the earthquake and site-to-source/epicentral distance and they
discriminate whether a geotechnical failure can or cannot occur
according to historical observations. The triggering assessment
is conducted for those locations indicated as susceptible, and it
is performed adopting physical-based or semiempirical large-scale
methodologies. Finally, PGD is calculated adopting empirical
formulations for those locations in which the geotechnical failure
is triggered. For each point of interest, the final PGD is the
maximum of the PGD values due to landslide and liquefaction.
The two new geotechnical models are described in more detail
subsequently.
Landslide Model
The landslide susceptibility analysis is based on the empirical
failure domains proposed by Keefer (1984), who defined three
empirical domains corresponding to three different landslide typol-
ogies [Fig. 1(g)]. If information on the landslide typologies is not
available, the more conservative domain can be adopted [i.e., the
Type I line in Fig. 1(g)]. If the coupled magnitude-epicentral dis-
tance falls into the domain of potential failure, then the triggering
phenomenon is analyzed; conversely, outside the failure domain,
the landslide is deemed negligible and the PGD due to landslide
is equal to zero.
This study analyzed the triggering only with reference to trans-
lational landslides, i.e., landslides displacing along a planar or un-
dulating surface of rupture, sliding out over the original ground
surface (Varnes 1978); rotational landslides were neglected because
their safety factor (SF) is generally higher than the SF for planar
landslides (Ferentinou et al. 2006). The triggering is analyzed with
Newmark’s method (Newmark 1965). This model treats the land-
slide as a rigid block that slides on an inclined plane [Fig. 1(h)]
when the critical acceleration ac (i.e., the threshold base acceler-
ation required to overcome the resistance and initiate sliding) is
exceeded. For analyses at the regional level, a simple limit-
equilibrium model of an infinite slope in material having both
friction and cohesive strength can be applied; under these hypoth-
eses, the factor of safety is given by
SF ¼ c
0
γ · t · sinα
þ tanϕ
0
tanα
− u · γw · tanϕ
0
γ · tanα
ð8Þ
where ϕ 0, c 0, and γ = effective friction angle, effective cohesion,
and soil unit weight, respectively; u = saturation ratio; γw = unit
weight of water; and α and t = slope angle and slope-normal thick-
ness of the failure slab. Parameters t and u are the most difficult to
estimate at large scale; this paper studies u as a parameter; in the
absence of detailed information, t can be estimated using models
that correlate topographic characteristics with slab depth (Saulnier
et al. 1997; Tesfa et al. 2009; Catani et al. 2010; Shafique
et al. 2011).
Once the SF is computed, the critical acceleration ac can be
calculated according to
ac ¼ ðSF − 1Þ · g · sinα ð9Þ
where g = acceleration of gravity. For a given site of interest, if the
simulated acceleration exceeds ac, then lock sliding initiates, the
landslide is triggered, and the PGD can be calculated be means
of a proper empirical formulation [Fig. 1(i)]. This study adopted
the formulation proposed by Saygili and Rathje (2008), presenting
the lowest predictive error [Eq. (10)]. The regression coefficients
adopted are a1 ¼ −1.56, a2 ¼ −4.58, a3 ¼ −20.84, a4 ¼ 44.75,
a5 ¼ −30.5, a6 ¼ −0.64, and a7 ¼ 1.55
lnPGD ¼ a1 þ a2

ac
PGA

þ a3

ac
PGA

2
þ a4

ac
PGA

3
þ a5

ac
PGA

4
þ a6 ln PGAþ a7 ln PGV ð10Þ
Liquefaction Model
Several liquefaction susceptibility domains are available in the
literature for different geographical regions (Papadopoulos and
Lefkopoulos 1993; Papathanassiou et al. 2005; Martino et al.
2014). This study conducted the liquefaction susceptibility analysis
according to the three failure domains proposed by Galli (2000),
based on Italian data and suitable for the subsequent case study.
The envelope of the three domains in Galli (2000) was adopted
[i.e., envelope line in Fig. 1(j)]. For a given seismic event and
for a specific site, the triggering analysis can be carried out only
if the magnitude and the epicentral distance fall in the failure
domain.
The triggering analysis [Fig. 1(k)] was performed through the
well-consolidated semiempirical method proposed initially by Seed
and Idriss (1971) and subsequently improved in several studies in
order to create a shear-wave velocity-based liquefaction triggering
assessment (Goda et al. 2011; Kayen et al. 2013). Goda et al.
(2011) presents an example of application of such a methodology
to the large scale. This paper adopted the probabilistic formulation
proposed by Kayen et al. (2013). Specifically, the safety factor for
liquefaction can be calculated as
SF ¼ CSR
CRR
ð11Þ
where CSR= cyclic stress ratio; and CRR = cyclic resistance ratio.
According to Seed and Idriss (1971), the CSR at a given depth z is
given by
CSR ¼ 0.65 · PGA
g
·
σvðzÞ
σ 0vðzÞ
·
rdðzÞ
MSFðMÞ ð12Þ
where PGA is the result of the simulations discussed in section
“Seismic Hazard Model” [Fig. 1(f)]; σ 0vðzÞ and σvðzÞ = vertical
effective and total stress, respectively, at depth z; MSFðMÞ =
magnitude scaling factor, defined by Youd et al. (2001) as
ðM=7.5Þ−2.56; and rdðzÞ = shear-stress reduction factor, given
by Kayen et al. (2013) according to the following expression:
rdðzÞ ¼
1þ −23.013−2.949 · PGAþ0.999 ·Mþ0.0525 ·Vs;12
16.258þ0.201 · exp½0.341 · ð−zþ0.0785 ·Vs;12þ7.586Þ
1þ −23.013−2.949 · PGAþ0.999 ·Mþ0.0525 ·Vs;12
16.258þ0.201 · exp½0.341 · ð0.0785 ·Vs;12þ7.586Þ
ð13Þ
where Vs;12 = average shear wave velocity in the upper 12 m of the
soil column, obtained from the available Vs;30 through the meth-
odology proposed by Boore (2004). According to Kayen et al.
(2013) the CRR is given as
© ASCE 04018018-5 J. Pipeline Syst. Eng. Pract.
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CRR ¼ exp
½ð0.0073Vs1Þ2.8011 − 2.6168 lnðMÞ − 0.0099 ln σ 0v þ 0.0028FC − 0.4809Φ−1ðPLÞ
1.946

ð14Þ
where Vs1 = stress-corrected shear wave velocity defined by
Vs1 ¼ Vs;12 · min

Pa
σ 0v

0.25
; 1.5

ð15Þ
where Pa = reference stress equal to 100 kPa. In Eq. (14), FC is the
percentage of fines content, Φ−1ð·Þ indicates the operator inverse of
a cumulative normal distribution, and PL is the liquefaction prob-
ability term. Several formulations of PL are available in the liter-
ature (Juang et al. 2002; Kayen et al. 2013); this study adopted the
PGA-based formulation proposed by Santucci de Magistris et al.
(2013) because it is based on Italian data.
It is then possible to conclude the triggering analysis calculating
the liquefaction potential index (LPI), which is an indicator that
succinctly captures the potential liquefaction damage to subsurface
structures. LPI was originally proposed by Iwasaki et al. (1978);
it is calculated according to Eq. (16), where wðzÞ ¼ 10 − 0.5z and
SF is set equal to 0 if SF is greater than 1
LPI ¼
Z
20
0
SFðzÞ · wðzÞ · dz ð16Þ
Once the liquefaction potential is computed, then the
liquefaction-induced PGD required for the risk and loss analysis
can be calculated [Fig. 1(l)]. Toprak and Holzer (2003) identified
specific values of LPI corresponding to specific damage scenario. If
LPI is less than 5, then the liquefaction is not triggered and the PGD
due to liquefaction is equal to 0. If LPI is between 5 and 12–15 (this
study assumed 13.5 as a boundary limit), sand boiling and conse-
quently vertical settlements are expected, and therefore PGD is
equal to the vertical settlement. Finally, if LPI is greater than
12–15, lateral spreading also is expected to occur, and the PGD
is calculated as the square root of sum of square (SRSS) of the
vertical settlements and the lateral spread displacements.
The vertical settlement due to sand boiling can be computed
according to Tanabe and Takada (1988) from Eq. (17), where H is
the thickness of the liquefiable layer and N is the number from the
standard penetration test. In the absence of detailed information, N
can be empirically correlated with the friction angle (Schmertmann
1978)
PGDSettlement ¼ 0.3 · H ·
PGA
N
þ 2 ð17Þ
The lateral spread is calculated as proposed by Bardet et al.
(1999) using Eq. (18), where the regression coefficients are
b0 ¼−7.586, b1 ¼ 1.109, b2 ¼−0.233, b3 ¼−0.025, b4 ¼ 0.477,
and b5 ¼ 0.579
lnðPGDLateral Spread þ 0.01Þ ¼ b0 þ b1M þ b2 lnðRÞ þ b3R
þ b4 lnðαÞ þ b5 lnðHÞ ð18Þ
Three-Phase Geotechnical Model
The three-phase geotechnical approach for landslides and liquefac-
tion assessment brings together well-established methodologies
with recently developed probabilistic formulations specialized for
the Italian geographical context. Because of the modularity of the
approach, if newmodels are available for each phase or for different
geographical contexts, the procedure can be further improved and
adapted to other areas. Such versatility of the procedure is one of
the main novelties of this work, and it fits perfectly within the
performance-based engineering framework and its general princi-
ple of deconstructing the risk problem.
Risk Assessment
For each of the five correlation cases (i.e., C1–C5) presented in
section “Seismic Hazard Model,” PGA and PGV were simulated
for all the pipeline segments [Fig. 2(a)]. The geotechnical ap-
proaches for landslide and liquefaction allowed the calculation
of the PGD (i.e., the maximum among the two geotechnical phe-
nomena). The three IMs were then convoluted with vulnerability
and fragility models. Specifically, vulnerability models related di-
rectly the IM with the losses (e.g., number of breaks and leaks),
whereas fragility functions related the IM with the probability of
exceeding a specific level of damage. This study adopted empirical
vulnerability and fragility models from the literature. Vulnerability
functions [Fig. 2(b)] were convoluted with the hazard to obtain loss
curves [Fig. 2(c)], i.e., curves representing the probability of reach-
ing or exceeding a specified level of loss; instead, fragility func-
tions [Fig. 2(d)] were adopted in a nontraditional manner to
build damage maps [Fig. 2(e)] aimed at supporting the infrastruc-
ture manager in deciding where to deploy inspection teams to
verify potential damage to the system in the aftermath of an event.
Vulnerability Functions and Loss Curves for Natural
Gas Pipelines
The HAZUS manual (FEMA 2004) identifies two damage states
(DS) for pipelines: (1) leak and (2) break. Such damage states
can be induced both by transient actions, also known as strong
ground shaking (SGS), and by ground failure (GF) phenomena,
such as earthquake-induced landslides and liquefactions. Accord-
ing to HAZUS, if the damage is induced by GF, the percentage of
leaks and breaks is estimated as 20 and 80%, respectively. Con-
versely, if the pipeline is damaged by SGS, the percentage of leaks
and breaks is reversed, to 80 and 20%, respectively.
The American Lifeline Alliance (ALA 2001) provides damage
functions for buried pipes that take into consideration different
damage sources (i.e., SGS and GF), materials, diameters, and
joint typologies. Such functions permit the calculation of the repair
rate (RR) expressed in terms of normalized length (1=km) as
follows:
RR;SGS ¼ K1 · 0.002416 · PGV ð19Þ
RR;GF ¼ K2 · 11.223 · PGD0.319 ð20Þ
where, for example, K1 and K2 for iron continuous pipelines are
both equal to 0.15. Eqs. (19) and (20) correspond to SGS and GF,
respectively; therefore, according to HAZUS indications, the ex-
pected number of leaks and breaks along the infrastructure can
be calculated according to Eqs. (21) and (22), where Li is the length
of the ith segment of the infrastructure
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# of leaks ¼
X
i
ð0.8 · RR;SGSi þ 0.2 · RR;SGSiÞ · Li ð21Þ
# of breaks ¼
X
i
ð0.2 · RR;SGSi þ 0.8 · RR;SGSiÞ · Li ð22Þ
The empirical complementary cumulative distribution function
of the numbers of leak and breaks [Fig. 2(c)] obtained from the
simulations of IMs will be the first result available to the infra-
structure managers. This is a novel result available to infrastructure
managers who typically make use only of the PGA shakemaps
provided by national geological survey services (e.g., United
States Geological Survey or Italian National Institute of Geophys-
ics and Volcanology). Each simulation produces the values of
PGA, PGV and consequently PGD (through the three-step geo-
technical module) for each pipeline segment (Fig. 2). These values
are used in Eqs. (19) and (20) to obtain the repair rate for SGS and
GF. Repair rates are transformed into breaks and leaks according to
Eqs. (21) and (22) and then summed for the entire network con-
sidered. The simulation results are then represented as empirical
complementary cumulative distribution function of breaks and
leaks over the whole portion of the network considered, represent-
ing the probability of exceeding a specific number of breaks or
leaks, respectively.
If the repair cost for each damage typology is available, loss
curves can be derived by multiplying Eqs. (21) and (22) by the
respective repair costs. As an example, the HAZUS manual
(FEMA 2004) suggests a repair cost for a break of US$1,000
for a welded steel pipe with gas-welded joints (category NGP1).
The literature provides more recent figures (e.g., INGAA
2016). For each simulation, the total number of breaks and
leaks can be transformed into costs and the empirical comple-
mentary cumulative distribution function for losses can be
provided.
Fragility Functions and Damage Maps for Natural Gas
Pipelines
Several fragility curves are available in the literature (Piccinelli and
Krausmann 2013); this study adopted models proposed by Lanzano
et al. (2014) because of their large and up-to-date underpinning
database. Lanzano et al. (2014) presented lognormal and logistic
fragility functions for different joint typologies and for SGS and
GF corresponding to three damage states: DS0, corresponding
to no damage; DS1, corresponding to longitudinal and circumfer-
ential cracks and potential compression joint breaks; and DS2, for
tension cracks along continuous pipelines and joint loosening in
segmented pipelines. Fragilities for SGS and GF are functions
of PGV and PGA, respectively. In general, fragility functions
are convoluted with the hazard to obtain the risk of the system; this
study adopted fragilities to draw damage maps. In particular, for
each scenario simulation, i.e., for each PGA and PGV simulated
in the hazard module for the specific pipeline segment, it is possible
to calculate the probability of reaching DS0, DS1, and DS2 for both
SGS and GF according to Lanzano et al. (2014) [Fig. 2(d)]. The
specific segment of the infrastructure is characterized by the dam-
age state having the highest probability of occurrence. The simu-
lations provide the frequency of damage for each segment of
pipeline, and the modal value among all the simulations identifies
the expected DS for the specific segment, resulting in a map of the
expected damage states on the infrastructure [Fig. 2(e)] that can be
used as tool to prioritize the inspections in the aftermath of an
earthquake.
Critical Notes on Risk Assessment
The preceding risk assessment represents a cutting-edge enhance-
ment of alternative literature methodologies for pipeline networks
(e.g., Esposito et al. 2015) because it includes, for the first time,
different correlation and cross-correlation models between IMs,
and it adopts two three-phase mirrored geotechnical approaches
for landslides and liquefaction. Moreover, the adoption of fragility
functions to generate damage maps is an innovative adaptation of
the fragility tool to the DSS context.
In its current development stage, the methodology includes
the treatment of uncertainties related to the hazard and the vulner-
ability through the use of Monte Carlo simulation based on the
GMPE and the fragility curves, respectively. The three-step geo-
technical model and the costs do not include the implementation
of uncertainties at this stage.
To demonstrate the efficiency of the methodology and quantify
the significance of the novel aspects introduced, the following
sections present a detailed case study.
Case Study
Italian Gas Pipeline Network
The Italian gas pipeline network is formed by the national trans-
mission network (spanning approximately 8,800 km) and by the
regional distribution networks, which extend more than 22,600 km.
Fig. 3(a) shows the Italian transmission network and the regional
distribution network. The first plays a vital role because it is the
backbone of the gas flow imported from abroad; in particular,
gas is injected in the national network systems through eight ter-
minals, five import points [Gela, Gorizia, Mazzara del Vallo, Passo
Gires, and Tarvisio; Fig. 3(a)] and three regasification stations
[Cavarzere, Livorno, and Panigaglia; Fig. 3(a)]. Pipelines belong-
ing to the national network are characterized by large diameters,
buried depth greater than 90 cm (on average 1.5 m), and nominal
and operating pressures of 70 and 50 kPa, respectively (Vianello
and Maschio 2014).
This study focused on the national network crossing the Friuli
Venezia Giulia region [shaded area in Fig. 3(a)]; this region is si-
multaneously strategic because of the presence of the Tarvisio and
Gorizia import points, and also an area of high seismic activity.
Fig. 3(b) shows the portion of national gas pipelines network an-
alyzed in this study. The total pipeline length is about 510 km, and
diameters range from 26 to 48 in. (about 660–1,220 mm).
The geometry of the system is realistic and is provided publicly
by the company managing the network, Snam Rete Gas. For the
purposes of sampling, the pipelines were discretized into 10,975
segments having an average length of about 50 m.
Fig. 3(b) shows also the topography of the region. The connec-
tion from Tarvisio takes advantage of a valley to cross the Alps;
from the Tarvisio input point, the pipeline network has three par-
allel branches, and from Gorizia it has only one branch. The higher
number of parallel branches increases the redundancy and therefore
the resilience of the system (Golara and Esmaeily 2016).
1976 Friuli Earthquake
To assess the risk of the case-study network, the Mw 6.4 earthquake
that occurred in Friuli on May 6, 1976, was used as the base
scenario. This event was used because it was the strongest instru-
mentally recorded event in the northern Italy region (Moratto
et al. 2011). Ten seismic stations recorded the event across Italy,
and measurements are freely accessible (Pacor et al. 2011);
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Gorizia
Tarvisio
Fault
Cohesion
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Weight unit
(g)
Tarvisio
Gorizia
Passo 
Gries
Mazzara del Vallo
Gela
Panigaglia
Livorno
Cavarzere
National network (Transmission)
Regional network (Distribution)
LNG regasification terminals 
Import points
Fig. 3. (a) Italian gas pipeline network; (b) transmission gas pipeline network in Friuli Venezia Giulia overlaid on DEM and 1976 earthquake fault;
(c) slopes; (d) Vs;30 values; (e) friction angles; (f) cohesion values; and (g) unit weight of soil formations.
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Fig. 3(b) represents four of the ten stations as triangles. Fig. 3(b)
also depicts the fault plane as defined by the Italian database of
individual seismogenic sources (DISS Working Group 2018).
For the Monte Carlo simulation, this paper adopted the GMPE
proposed by Bindi et al. (2011) [Figs. 1(d–f)] as the most suitable
and recent GMPE based on the Italian event database. Bindi
et al. calibrated an intraevent standard deviation for PGA and
PGV of 0.29 and 0.27, respectively.
Available Data
Several maps were collected for the case study and a geodatabase
was assembled in a geographical information system (GIS) frame-
work: first, a 30-m resolution digital elevation model for the ana-
lyzed region [Fig. 3(b)] was obtained from the shuttle radar
topography mission (SRTM) project (Farr et al. 2007). Then, based
on DEM data, the map of slopes [Fig. 3(c)] was calculated. For
Vs;30 [Fig. 3(d)], the USGS Global Vs30 Map Server was used
(Wald and Allen 2007) in combination with the soil map adopted
by the Italian Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV)
(Michelini et al. 2008). Finally, maps of soil friction angle
[Fig. 3(e)], cohesion [Fig. 3(f)], and unit weight [Fig. 3(g)] were
synthesized on the basis of the 1:500,000 Italian geological map
(MEPLS 2018) and the 1:150,000 regional geolithological map
(IRDAT-FVG 2018). This information needs to be gathered in
advance for the area of interest in order for the postearthquake risk
assessment tool to be ready when an event occurs. A fair amount of
information is often available to the network manager, and it can be
used for the set-up of the risk assessment tool.
Results
To obtain stable low/high percentiles of final losses, 10,000 simu-
lations are needed. The entire simulation procedure and the gener-
ation of the loss curves and the damage maps can be performed
in less than twenty minutes, and therefore it is very suitable for
a postevent DSS.
Loss Curves
Fig. 4 shows the loss curves obtained considering the five different
correlation structures (C1–C5) and two different values of soil
saturation, u. Specifically, curves represent the number of leaks
[Fig. 4(a)] and breaks [Fig. 4(b)] along the studied network,
and the corresponding repair [Fig. 4(c)] and replacement costs
[Fig. 4(d)] based on unit repair costs (US$20,000) and replacement
costs (US$130,000) that were obtained from the Interstate Natural
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Fig. 4. Loss curves considering 50% (dashed lines) or 100% (continuous lines) soil saturation in terms of (a) number of leaks; (b) number of breaks;
(c) expected repair cost CR; and (d) replacement cost C0.
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Gas Association of America (INGAA 2016). These values were
assumed for each leak and break obtained from the simulations
and summed to obtain the complementary cumulative distribution
function of losses.
Focusing on the cost estimates of Fig. 4, from a geotechnical
point of view, an increase in soil saturation (i.e., from 50 to
100%) leads to an increase of the expected losses because of its
significant influence on both landslide and liquefaction. Therefore,
it is very important to have detailed information about the soil
saturation along the infrastructure route (e.g., Lillesand et al.
2014).
From a statistical point of view, neglecting the correlation
(Model C1, Fig. 4) leads to large underestimation of the final
losses, as also observed by other studies for other typologies of
infrastructures (e.g., Miano et al. 2016). Moreover, when the spatial
correlation and the cross-correlation between IMs are taken into
account, the dispersion of losses tends to decrease with respect
to C1, leading to a more accurate estimation. In this case study,
the results obtained considering the spatial correlation and neglect-
ing the updating (i.e., Case C2) tended to slightly underestimate
the losses with respect to the case which included updating (C4).
Differences between Cases C3 and C5 were negligible; when both
spatial correlation and cross-correlation were considered, the fur-
ther updating with real data did not improve the final assessment.
Thus, neglecting the cross-correlation of the intensity measures
may lead to an underestimation of postearthquake losses.
Damage Maps
Fig. 5 shows the maps of potential damage induced by SGS and GF.
The predominant damage state is DS1 and the localization of the
damage is mainly in the projection of the fault plane (the rectangle
in Fig. 5).
In this study, it was extremely rare to attain DS2 for such
types of infrastructure under earthquake actions, as also empha-
sized by the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group in
their annual report on gas pipeline incidents (EGIG 2015).
Nonetheless, regional networks can be more susceptible to earth-
quakes and potentially can incur major damage (DS2). The same
map also plots historical observations of landslides and liquefac-
tion, according to the Italian Catalogo italiano degli Effetti Defor-
mativi del suolo Indotti dai forti Terremoti (CEDIT) database
(Martino et al. 2014). All the geotechnical failures historically
recorded were very close to pipelines locations characterized as
damaged (DS1) according to the methodology. In the future,
the proposed damage maps can be integrated with satellite surveys
of geotechnical failures [which are increasingly available nowa-
days and are often adopted in postearthquake recognition (Sextos
et al. 2018)] in order to increase the level of confidence in the
localization of potential damage.
Conclusions
This paper presented a methodology to quantify losses in terms of
repair costs, leaks, and breaks and to localize the damage of a gas
transmission infrastructure in the first critical period after a major
earthquake. The methodology is composed of a Monte Carlo sim-
ulation–based procedure for the generation of plausible intensity
measure fields that are spatially correlated and cross-correlated;
two new back-to-back three-phase geotechnical approaches ac-
counting for (1) susceptibility, (2) triggering, and (3) ground dis-
location due to landslide and liquefaction; and a risk approach
based on two different literature vulnerability and fragility models.
The application to a real case study verified the coherence and com-
putational efficiency of the methodology, and led to the following
conclusions:
1. Considering spatial correlation and cross-correlation of the
intensity measures required to assess the seismic risk of natural
gas pipeline networks leads to a more reliable estimate of losses,
avoiding the potential underestimation that was observed when
the intensity measures were taken as fully uncorrelated or
simply spatially correlated;
2. The updating of the intensity measure fields from accelero-
metric stations in real time, if available after the earthquake,
is beneficial because it allows anchoring the calculations to real
observations;
3. The methodology presented herein provides the infrastructure
stakeholder with a breakdown of costs and type of interventions
required in case of damage in the aftermath of the earthquake
event; and
4. This methodology also produces maps localizing the expected
damage, thus facilitating inspection missions and reducing the
recovery time in the aftermath of a seismic event.
(a) (b)
Historical landslides
Historical liquefactions
Fig. 5. Damage maps for case of IMs spatially correlated and cross-correlated obtained considering updating from accelerometric stations (C5)
corresponding to (a) SGS; and (b) GF.
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Further study is needed for the implementation of coseismic
effects considering stochastic simulation of the fault slip, as re-
cently suggested by Goda (2017). New vulnerability models are
also required to better reflect the damage typology, potentially us-
ing machine learning algorithms. This work can be extended com-
bining the damage maps with (nearly) real-time data on landslides
that can be retrieved through satellite imagery and remote sensing
capabilities.
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